

- 16 He does not make a similar denial concerning pain, no doubt because of his hedonism.
- 17 Phaino-words are often used by Plato to designate the "presence" or visibility of the Ideas. For discussion, see "Anti-platonism" in my *The Ancients and the Moderns: Rethinking Modernity* (New Haven, 1989), chapter 3.

Correspondence, projective properties, and expression in the arts

RICHARD WOLLHEIM

I start with a phenomenon that is familiar to us all.¹ I illustrate it from my own experience, but the phenomenon itself, or that which the illustrations exemplify, is of wider significance. It has a lot to tell us about expression in the arts. It lies at its core. Or such is the claim of this chapter. In point of fact, though I believe this claim is true for all the arts, here I shall develop it solely for the visual arts.

So for the examples:

Autumn rain has been falling throughout the early afternoon. It stops abruptly, and the sun breaks through. Drops of water sparkle on the leaves and on the grey slates, and they drip down onto the pavement, which glistens with a hard sheen. The sky is blue, but streaked with black, suggesting distant rain. This is a melancholy scene.

The narrow road rises and falls. Along the verge on either side there are apple-trees in blossom. The fields as they slope away from the road are a brilliant green, dotted with the blue, yellow, and white of wild flowers. A few miles away the mountains rise up sharply from the rolling landscape. They are grey rising to blue, cut by the silver lines of mountain torrents. Patches of snow persist on the rock face. The air is fresh, and there is the sound of cowbells. At the foot of the mountains, beyond the rich orchards, there are large half-timbered farmhouses forming villages. It is a happy countryside.

What each of these passages has to tell us can be recorded in one or other of two ways. We can, in Rudolf Carnap's distinction, use the material mode of speech or the formal mode of speech. Using the material mode of speech, we would say that sunlight after rain is melancholy, that the Bavarian landscape is happy. Using the formal mode of speech, we would say that the sunlit scene is called "melancholy," or that the predicate "happy" is applied to the

landscape. We can say how certain things are, or we can say how they are described.

There are philosophers who on metaphysical grounds would hold that the formal mode of speech is invariably more fundamental: it shows what is basic. But there are other philosophers, who don't have such general views, but who nevertheless maintain that in the sort of case I have just cited resort to the formal mode of speech is better. It is more perspicuous. Their reasoning would go as follows: neither the suburban scene nor the Bavarian landscape has a psychology. In consequence neither can have a psychological property. Neither can actually be melancholy or sad. That being so, we cannot in cases like this explain our saying that the suburban scene is melancholy or that the landscape is happy, by appealing to the fact that this is how they are. In consequence explanation has to go the other way round, and we must explain our thinking that the suburban scene is melancholy (which it couldn't be), or that the landscape is happy (which it couldn't be), by appeal to the practice of calling the suburban scene "melancholy" or calling the landscape "happy." In these particular cases, the reasoning runs, the formal mode of speech does indeed reveal what is basic.

Let me call the phenomenon that my examples illustrate "correspondence": a word that derives from the visionary Swedenborg, and was made familiar by a poem of Baudelaire's. In my examples the suburban scene corresponds to melancholy, the landscape corresponds to happiness, and correspondence is, it must be recognized, one way, just one way, in which we can correlate parts of nature with psychological phenomena. I shall call the view that we can explain correspondence by reference to a special use of psychological predicates the Predication view. The Predication view holds that, when we think that some part of nature corresponds to a psychological phenomenon, this is because we have the habit of applying to that part of nature the predicate that we normally reserve for persons who are in the grip of that phenomenon. Of course, it might be thought that, for the Predication view to be cogent, it has to give an account of the otherwise mysterious predications that it takes as basic. Without such a further account its diagnosis of correspondence seems incomplete.² With this further account, correspondence is explained away.

II

In this section I want to argue against the Predication view. It can, I believe, be faulted on two counts. There are two assumptions it

makes, neither of which is well founded. The effect of these assumptions is to obscure from us the real nature of correspondence, and so the real nature of expression in the arts. It makes us look in the wrong direction.

The first assumption is that, in each case of correspondence, or whenever we think that some part of nature corresponds to a psychological phenomenon, the predicate that is ordinarily applied to persons exhibiting this phenomenon can be correctly applied to this part of nature. If there is no such widespread practice, the Predication view lapses. That which it cites in order to explain what it wishes to explain is a myth. Let us call the practice whereby a psychological predicate has this dual application — to persons in a certain condition and to nature insofar as it corresponds to this condition — the "doubling-up" of the predicate, and it seems to me clear that correspondence does not universally correlate with doubling-up of the predicate. There are cases where the two go together and cases where there is one without the other, and as important as this fact is the further fact that there seems no principled way of accounting for the two kinds of case.³ For instance, nature can be found to correspond to depression and to terror as well as to melancholy and to happiness, but, though we can call nature "melancholy" and "happy," we cannot call it "depressed" or "terrified" — or, more precisely, we cannot call it "depressed" or "terrified" for the reason that it corresponds to depression or terror — and there is no apparent explanation why this should be so. Of course, once we do think that some part of nature corresponds to depression or terror, we can cobble up some predicate that will do the work that the inapplicable predicate cannot take on. But it is obvious that any such improvisation cannot give the Predication view any support. Once improvisation is called for, it must be the case that what we say follows on from what we think, not vice versa.

The second assumption that the Predication view makes, also erroneously, is that, when we apply to corresponding nature a psychological predicate, there is no property of the object to which we thereby refer. What is given as a reason for this, and what is undoubtedly true, is surely irrelevant. This is that there is no psychological property of the object to which we thereby refer: we do not, in this kind of predication, refer to a property that could be possessed only by the possessor of a psychology. That is true, but it is irrelevant, because it is perfectly possible that the psychological predicates that we apply to corresponding nature refer to properties,

but not to the properties that they refer to in their standard use. In other words, we could hold the view that there is what philosophers call "a fact of the matter" to correspondence without believing in animism or committing the Pathetic Fallacy. In fact I believe that such a view is right, even though it does require invoking a notion that I believe we should in general try to avoid: ambiguity. Psychological predicates that double up are ambiguous.

Let us consider for a moment an alternative strategy to which a supporter of the Predication view might incline, since it would allow him to deny that psychological predicates applied to corresponding nature pick out properties. It also has an independent plausibility. This strategy consists in maintaining that such predicates are used metaphorically.⁴ The supporter of the Predication view would claim, in other words, that it is metaphorical to say of the suburban scene that it is melancholy, or of the Bavarian landscape that it is happy.

Let me hasten to add that, when I credit this view of the matter to an upholder of the Predication view, I am for the purposes of the present argument assuming him also to hold a certain recently espoused view of metaphor.⁵ This is a view which I find wholly plausible; though I dare say not everyone does, and it makes the following sense of his words: when the suburban scene is called "melancholy" or the landscape "happy," the two predicates retain their standard meaning, even though this results in the sentences to which they contribute being false; but the speaker is indifferent to their truth value, for the point of metaphor is not to convey information, but to get the hearer to see what is being talked about in a new light, and this effect can be achieved variously by banalities, implausibilities, and arrant falsehoods. Such a view of metaphor makes metaphor a genuine alternative to ambiguity in explaining our thoughts about correspondence. Is it a convincing alternative?

Metaphorical assertions about nature may be thought of as falling into two rough groups. There are those metaphors which try to capture a transient aspect of nature, or an aspect that is dependent upon the mood we are in. And there are those metaphors which try to capture aspects of nature that are independent of our mood and that endure until nature itself changes. Now it is only the second kind of metaphorical assertion that could be relevant to correspondence. Correspondence is not dependent on mood, though, where correspondence is with a certain mood, being in that mood may help us discern it. However I contend that it would be wrong to identify attributions of correspondence with any kind of metaphorical asser-

tion: with the second kind no less than with the first. Metaphor and attribution of correspondence are different, in that they do different things. The difference between them may be brought out like this: what attributions of correspondence do is that they refer to, or pick out, those properties of nature of which related metaphorical assertions are intended to heighten our awareness. Attributions of correspondence do what some advocates of the theory of metaphor I have been supporting tell us is impossible: they give us directly what metaphor aims at by indirection. (In claiming that the direct approach is impossible, such philosophers, I should claim, overlook attributions of correspondence.)

If I am right, a grasp of the real difference between metaphorical assertion and attribution of correspondence supports the view that correspondence is a matter of the properties that nature possesses, and in this regard it undercuts the attempt to explain – or, as we might say, to explain away – correspondence by appeal to certain things that in certain circumstances we say about nature. In other words, it undercuts the Predication view. But once we turn round the direction of explanation and attempt to explain the practice we have of, say, calling the landscape "happy" by appeal to its being so, the issue arises of what kind of property this involves. If correspondence does rest on the properties of nature, they are certainly not ordinary properties: they are properties of an unusual kind. Thinking about what they must be like can drive us back, in desperation, into the Predication view. It can convince us, if against the grain, that the phenomenon of correspondence is, after all, best characterized in the formal mode of speech. This is a temptation to resist.

If the Predication view is misguided, then correspondence survives as a genuine phenomenon, which, as we shall see, can play its part in a broad account of expression in the arts. But, first, some refinements, and then a deepening of the topic.

I have already implied that psychological predicates can be applied to parts of nature for various reasons: correspondence to psychological phenomena is only one such reason. When I say that a slope is gentle, or a province of the empire is peaceful, or that the lake is treacherous, that has nothing to do with correspondence. In the first case, I am saying something about how easy the slope is to negotiate; in the second case I am transferring to a tract of land the character of

the people who inhabit it: in the third case, not an uncommon kind of case, I am thinking of the lake as some faceless creature and attributing to it a personality. However, when psychological predicates are applied to nature for reasons of correspondence, what they refer to I call projective properties. (It follows from what I said earlier that some projective properties cannot be referred to by psychological predicates. In such cases, we have to resort to some improvised locution.)

What then are projective properties?

In the first place, projective properties are properties that we identify through experiences that we have: experiences that are both caused by those properties and of them. In this regard projective properties resemble secondary properties, such as color.⁶

If however we ask what is distinctive about projective properties, the answer lies with the nature of the experience through which we identify them. The experience has a special complexity. It has a complexity we don't find in the experience of secondary properties.

There are two aspects to this experience which account for its complexity. For, on the one hand, though the experience is a perceptual experience, it is not a wholly perceptual experience. It is a partly affective experience, but the affect that attaches to the experience is not affect directed towards the property itself. It is affect directed towards older or more dominant objects. When a fearful object strikes fear into an observer, as it does, it is not fear of that object. On the other hand, the experience reveals or intimates a history. It is not so much that each individual experience intimates narrowly its own history: that is true only of the formative experiences in the life-history of the person. What later experiences do is to intimate how the sort of experience they exemplify comes about. Such experiences occur originally in the aftermath of projection, and the fact that later experiences intimate this origin, and do so even when they do not themselves originate in this way, is the reason why I call them experiences of "projective" properties.

The nature of projection apart, this last claim may still seem obscure: An experience can be of its history; certainly, but how can it reveal or intimate either its history or the history of experiences of the sort to which it belongs?

A comparison may help. Let us take experiential memory, or the capacity we have not just of remembering that certain events occurred in our life but of remembering those very events.⁷ Now, any particular experience of this kind that a person has is always of an

event in his life. But there is a further feature of experiential memory, and this feature might be characterized by saying that the memory intimates that it originated in the event that it is of. This is a further feature, for we might have had experiences which carried true beliefs about past events in our lives but, just because they didn't intimate that they originated in these events, they would be experiences which played a different role in our lives. For instance, we would not instinctively trust them.

However, if this comparison with experiential memory does something to illuminate the notion of intimation, it does little to make plausible the broader claim that I make about experiences of projective properties. For I claimed that when such experiences do not — and most do not — intimate how they came about, they do intimate how experiences of the sort that they exemplify come about in general. A different comparison may help to clarify this claim. The comparison is with pain. Most experiences of bodily pain intimate specifically how they originate, that is, in damage to that part of the body where they are felt. But there are some individual pains that do not arise in this way: the part of the body where they are felt is undamaged or has been amputated. But such pains, which are in the minority, nevertheless intimate how pain in general arises. It arises, they tell us, from damage to the body.

The next question to ask is, What is projection, and how can it have this afterlife?

IV

Projection is an internal act that we carry out under instinctual guidance, when there is either a mental condition of ours that we value (like love or curiosity) and that we find threatened, or one that we dread (like cruelty or melancholy) and by which we find ourselves threatened. Anxiety alerts us to this situation, and projection alters it. I shall not in this chapter investigate the nature of projection itself, except to suggest that it is bound up with phantasies that we entertain and that represent mental processes as bodily processes. I have elaborated this elsewhere.⁸ Instead I shall concentrate on the consequences of projection. The only danger to this tactic is that an unwary reader might identify projection itself with what are just the consequences of projection. I can only warn against that.

In order to spell out the consequences of projection, I must first distinguish, as the literature on the topic tends not to, between two

kinds of projection. I shall call them simple projection and complex projection, though the differences between them are greater than this might suggest.

I start with somewhat schematic examples.

For the sake of both examples we assume a person who is melancholy, but who can no longer tolerate his melancholy. Instinct compels him to project it. If this is a case of simple projection, the upshot will be this: (one) the person will now believe that some figure in the environment other than himself is melancholy, and (two) there will be some remission in his own interior condition. However, if this is a case of complex projection, the upshot will be this: (one) the person will come to look upon, and respond to, some part of the environment as melancholy; and (two) there will be a change for the better in his interior condition.

These schematic examples allow us to see straight off certain differences between the two forms of projection. Three differences need detain us:

In the first place, in the case of simple projection, projection is onto a figure in the environment, or something which possesses a psychology, or, at any rate onto something which is treated as though it had a psychology. With complex projection, projection is onto some natural part of the environment, or something which does not, and is not held to, possess a psychology.

Secondly, in the case of simple projection, it is basically the person's beliefs that are changed as the result of the internal act, whereas with complex projection, though the person's beliefs will certainly change, what is fundamental is a new attitude towards the environment, a new way of experiencing it, which is cemented by the new beliefs he acquires.

Thirdly, in the case of simple projection, the property that the figure in the environment is believed to have is the very same property as the person himself originally had. One is held now to be what the other was: melancholy. With complex projection, the property that some natural part of the environment is experienced as having is not the same as the property the person himself originally had. How could it be, given that nature has no psychology? A blanket-phrase, a made-up locution, for saying how the two properties are related would be this: that nature, in its relevant parts, is felt to be, not actually melancholy, but of a piece with the man's melancholy. A deceptive feature, which could misguidedly be seized on as an instructive feature, is that though, in the case of complex

projection, the two properties involved are different, in certain circumstances someone might use the same predicate to pick out both (as indeed I did, a few moments ago, in introducing complex projection).

We can now put simple projection out of our minds, for, of the two forms of projection, only complex projection could be capable of generating new properties, let alone properties of a new kind. But does complex projection have such a capacity? Can it alter the world? Does it have the after-life I attributed to it? There are deep metaphysical issues which I shall not probe. But I shall try to set out the situation as I see it.

V

I start a little way back with a point on which so far I have said nothing, and that is whether, when complex projection is activated, there must be an affinity between the inner condition of the person that is projected and the part of nature that it is projected onto. Must nature have features that encourage and sustain the projection? Or is this unnecessary? What seems certain is that, unless there is some such substrate, there can be no justification for saying that what the person experiences in the aftermath of projection is a property of nature.

This question cannot be answered without taking stock of the inherently developmental nature of projection. At the beginning of life, projection most likely occurs in a totally haphazard fashion. The infant projects feelings, welcome and unwelcome, onto random parts of the environment without any concern for what the environment is like. But, as a corollary, projection at this stage of development has only a transient effect. It may momentarily relieve anxiety but it has no enduring influence upon the way in which the infant continues to perceive the environment. However, as the psychology matures, projection becomes more orderly, and those parts of the environment upon which feelings are projected are now selected because of their affinity to these feelings. And in consequence they can continue to be experienced as of a piece with these feelings. What I have called the formative instances of projection can occur only after this developmental stage has been reached.

The next question to ask is, Granted that some affinity between the internal condition that is projected onto nature and the part of nature onto which it is projected is necessary if the latter is to be perceived in

some enduring fashion as of a piece with the former, why is this affinity not sufficient for the perception to occur? It obviously isn't: otherwise projection itself would not make any real contribution to our perception of projective properties, or (for that matter) to projective properties themselves.

But why is this so, and what is required over and above affinity?

To see what the requirement is, I propose that we return to the claim that I made in introducing projective properties and how they are experienced. That claim, it will be recalled, fell into two parts. Both parts of the claim are currently relevant.

The first part of the claim was that a number of such experiences intimate their own actual history: they intimate, in other words, that they derive from an instance of projection. Consider then the case of someone who has just projected his feelings onto the environment: say, melancholy. Now if this person perceives the relevant part of nature as of a piece with his melancholy, what will lead him to do this is, in addition to the affinity of one to the other, a memory of the projection. This memory will organize or structure the perception in a way that should be familiar to us from analogous cases. So, for instance, a person's pain in his thumb might well be stabilized by the memory that he has just grazed his thumb in the course of paring a carrot.

However, as things stand, this account of projective properties and our perception of them is uselessly narrow. For it confines that which can be explained to perceptions that occur in the immediate aftermath of projection. That is evidently too restrictive, for we can and do perceive nature as of a piece with our feelings in cases where we can no longer recall having projected those feelings onto it, and, indeed, to innumerable cases where we have not done so.

This brings us to the second part of the claim I made about our experience of projective properties. This was that those experiences of projective properties which do not intimate their own history nevertheless intimate how experiences of this sort originate: they intimate that they originate in projection. But how does this intimation make itself felt?

A natural suggestion is that this intimation takes the form of a recognitional capacity we have. In other words, we recognize parts of nature as those into which we might have, or could have, projected this or that kind of feeling. Indeed we might think that such a recognitional capacity is part and parcel of the ability to project. If we do, then, have such a capacity, it seems fully competent to extend the

explanation of our perception of projective properties beyond the narrow base provided by what I have called the aftermath of projection.

It might seem a lacuna in this account that I have said nothing informative about the affinity between mental conditions and parts of nature on to which we are inclined to project them. But is this a lacuna?⁹ It depends on what kind of information we look for. If what is wanted is knowledge of how nature must look in particular cases if it is to be apt for the projection of this rather than that feeling, then this demand must surely go unsatisfied. For how could we convincingly describe what it is about some aspect of nature that makes it suitable for the projection of some particular feeling without upgrading the mere affinity into the projective properties of which it is – at any rate, on my view – the mere substrate?

I hope I have said enough to suggest how the phenomenon of correspondence fits within the framework provided by projection and projective properties. The idea, briefly, is this: when some part of nature is held to correspond to a psychological phenomenon, this is because it is perceptible as being of a piece with that state or as something onto which we might have or could have projected the state. That it is perceptible in this way comes about through two factors which make their independent contributions to this result: an affinity in nature, and our capacity to project internal conditions.

VI

Correspondence has now received the refinement and the deepening that I promised, and I now turn to the central topic of this chapter: expression in the arts. Correspondence is interesting in itself, but it is fundamental because of the contribution it makes to the concept of artistic expression.

Let me first say that I am not confident that expression, specifically artistic expression, is one of those concepts of which we have such a strong pre-theoretical grasp that, when a theoretical elucidation is produced, it can be assessed by seeing how far it fits and explains what we originally took expression to be. Some of what philosophers will say on this subject must be stipulative. And I shall start by stipulating, contra Nelson Goodman, that artistic expression is invariably expression of an internal or psychological condition. The topic is thus returned to its tradition.

My central claim is that a work of art expresses an internal

condition by corresponding to, or being of a piece with, it. Furthermore the perceptible property in virtue of which it does so is a property it has intentionally: the property is due to the intentions of the artist. The artist intended the work to have this property so that it can express some internal condition that he had in mind.

VII

An initial trouble with this claim is that, as it stands, it is not merely compatible with, it seems positively to encourage, a counter-intuitive view of the matter. The view comes to this: when an artist who is engaged in making a work expressive of some internal condition judges that his work is complete because it now, in virtue of how it looks, expresses that condition, he arrives at this judgment in just the same way as a spectator would when he judges that some part of nature corresponds, in virtue of how it looks, to a particular internal condition; exactly the same evidence counts in the two cases. Now I certainly believe that the judgment in the two cases has the same content, but how the judgment is reached in the two cases is surely different. And what gives rise to the difference is the fact that, in one case, correspondence arises out of a creative act whereas, in the other case, it doesn't. In one case the correspondence is made; in the other case it is found. How what is judged comes to look as it does makes a difference.¹⁰

Ordinarily we recognize that history of production makes such a difference, or that it distinguishes correspondence in art from correspondence in nature. This comes out clearly if we adopt for a moment the epistemological perspective, or consider how we come to the conclusion that a work of art expresses this emotion or that feeling. (In certain respects accounts of expression go astray just because they over-emphasize the epistemological perspective. Consider, for instance, Gombrich's account.¹¹ But this is not one of those respects.) When we assign expressive value to a work of art, we invariably draw upon our knowledge of, or our beliefs about, the artistic processes involved. For instance, within the oeuvre of a given painter, we are likely to make different expressive assignments as we move from passages with broken brush strokes to passages with long fluent strokes. Knowledge of the technique influences our judgment. Such a judgment has still to do with the look of the picture, but it is an essential fact that the look that a picture has comes about through the processes of art. •

One striking way of putting the counter-intuitive view that my account of artistic expression appears to foster would be to say that it denies the creative act, in that it refuses to discriminate between the process of making an object and a process of selecting an object out of a large, perhaps an indefinite, range of pre-made objects. It assimilates the act of making to the act of choosing.¹²

But I must emphasize that, though there is this crucial difference between the way in which correspondence is established outside art, and the way in which it is achieved inside it, this does not mean – as a number of theorists have claimed – that in the domain of art correspondence is less dependent upon perception than it is in the domain of nature. It does not mean that correspondence in art is (dreaded word) conventional. In both domains, correspondence, being concerned with projective properties, is concerned with properties that are identified through our experience of them. The difference is that, in the case of art, the experience that is evidential for the projective property is based on a larger body of background knowledge, a larger cognitive stock, than is required for the perception of correspondence in nature. The background knowledge must include beliefs about a work's history of production and the specific processes of art that went to its making.

That expression in art, though it derives from a creative act, is nevertheless borne by strictly perceptible properties receives confirmation from an impeccable source: that is, the nature of the creative act itself, regarded as a piece of behavior.¹³ For across the visual arts the creative act always finds physical realization in a posture that allows, that encourages, the artist to attend to his work even as he makes it. It ensures that the artist is the original spectator of his work. But, if this is what he is, it is important to see why. He is so, not just in order to discover what he has made, but, crucially, in order to make it. The painter paints (partly) with his eyes; the sculptor carves or models (partly) with his eyes; the draughtsman draws (partly) with his eyes. In other words, if, as I have contended, correspondence in art derives from the artistic process, the process itself anticipates this through its physical or behavioral realization. For, by compelling the artist to take stock of the work as it comes into being, it permits him to see if it corresponds to the inner condition that he all the while has had in mind. He can, while making the work, note the experience that it causes in him and he can then regulate, by what he does to the work, the experience it may be expected to cause in others. And there are two other things that can be hoped for from

the conventional posture. In the first place, by repeating this process of what Gombrich would call "making and matching" over and over again, not merely within the making of one work, but across the making of different works, the artist can refine his sense of what it is for a work to correspond to a psychological condition. Secondly, as he makes each individual work, he can expect to acquire a better, a sharper, sense of just what psychological condition it is that he has in mind and is endeavoring to express.

VIII

There are two well-entrenched or traditional theories of expression in the arts, which, just because I have not mentioned them, I might be thought to be out of sympathy with. This is not the case.¹⁴ And, if I have delayed mentioning them, this is because I believe that my own account of artistic expression, couched in terms of intentional correspondence, can do better justice to the considerable truth that each theory, once it is properly amplified and articulated, can be seen to embody. Amplification is not the usual fate of either theory.¹⁵

According to the first theory, a work of art expresses a certain psychological condition just in case it was that psychological condition which caused the artist to make the work. According to the second theory, a work of art expresses a certain psychological condition just in case it is that psychological condition, which perception of the work causes in the mind of the spectator.

Each theory as it stands, or as it is usually formulated, suffers from two faults. Each theory has one feature too many, and one too few, and they are the same features in both cases. The adjustments required to remove one and to add the other are minor. They are not surgical.

As to the feature too many, both theories go wrong in requiring that the emotion that the work of art expresses is actually felt, whether this be (as our theory claims) by the artist or (as the other theory claims) by the spectator. This is not a sustainable requirement. What is enough is that (as I have been putting it) the emotion is something that the artist or spectator has in mind, or (perhaps better) if is something with which they are put in touch, or (perhaps best) it is something upon which, or upon memory of which, they can draw. These are not easy ideas, there is more to be said about them, but none of it will require us to revive what Nelson Goodman has named the Tingle-Immersion theory.¹⁶

As to the other fault, or the feature too few, both theories go wrong in failing to require that the work of art expressive of a certain emotion should look any one particular way. Yet surely it must. Expressiveness cannot be independent of appearance. What is necessary can however readily be written in by insisting that the causal chain that runs from the artist to the work of art (alternatively from the work of art to the spectator) should pass through a perception of the work as corresponding to the emotion that is expressed. This perception should, either way round, have its special causal weight to pull.

The two theories thus amplified, thus rectified, seem to me to fit in well with, perhaps to be constitutive parts of, the theory I have been urging.

Let me in conclusion refer to yet another traditional theory. It is often called the Local Quality theory, because it equates the expressiveness of a work with some sensible property that the work has.¹⁷ If that is what the theory says, then I am, as far as I can see, in favor of it. But traditionally, this traditional theory has been presented in such a sparse fashion, without the genetic psychology that I regard as crucial, that it lacks any clear claim upon our support. The greater part of what I have been saying in this essay may be regarded as an attempt to put this right.¹⁸

NOTES

- 1 This chapter deepens the view of expression to be found in Richard Wollheim, *Painting as an Art* (Princeton, N.J., and London, 1987).
- 2 A philosopher who offers such a further account, though exiguous, is Nelson Goodman, *Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols* (New York and Indianapolis, 1968; 2nd edn, Indianapolis, 1976).
- 3 This argument derives from Anthony Savile, "Nelson Goodman's *Languages of Art*," *British Journal of Aesthetics*, 2:1 (Winter 1971), pp. 3-27. See also Richard Wollheim, *The Sheep and the Ceremony* (Cambridge, 1979).
- 4 This position is upheld in Nelson Goodman, *Languages of Art*.
- 5 See Donald Davidson, "What Metaphors Mean," in his *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation* (Oxford, 1984).
- 6 Cf. John McDowell, "Values and Secondary Qualities," in *Morality and Objectivity: A Tribute to J. I. Mackie*, ed. T. Honderich (London, 1985).
- 7 This view of experiential memory is expounded at greater length in Richard Wollheim, *The Thread of Life* (Cambridge, 1984).

- 8 On projection and its two forms, see *The Thread of Life* (see note 7).
- 9 In trying to think about this issue, and elsewhere in writing this chapter, I have benefited, or at least had the opportunity to do so, from conversations with Malcolm Budd, who has an unrivaled understanding of the arguments.
- 10 Recognition of this point is central to the argument of John Dewey, *Art as Experience* (New York, 1934).
- 11 See E. H. Gombrich, *Meditations on a Hobby Horse and Other Essays on the Theory of Art* (London, 1963).
- 12 This error permeates so-called experimental aesthetics. Some writers have falsely concluded that an account of expression that appeals to correspondence is inevitably committed to this error, e.g., L. D. Ettlinger, *Kandinsky's "At Rest"* (Oxford, 1961).
- 13 I have developed this point in Richard Wollheim, *Painting as an Art*, chapter 1.
- 14 I have anticipated this point in Richard Wollheim, *Art and its Objects* (2nd edn, Cambridge, 1980), secs. 15–18.
- 15 For "unamplified" versions of the first view, see Leo Tolstoy, *What is Art?* (Moscow and London, 1898), and Harold Rosenberg, *The Tradition of the New* (New York, 1959), and for "unamplified" versions of the second view, see I. A. Richards, *Principles of Literary Criticism* (London, 1925), and Deryck Cooke, *The Language of Music* (London, 1959).
- 16 See Nelson Goodman, *Problems and Projects* (Indianapolis and New York, 1972) p. 94, where the theory is attributed to "Immanuel Tingle and Joseph Immersion (ca. 1880)." It proposes that "the proper behavior on encountering a work of art is to strip ourselves of all the vestments of knowledge and experience (since they might blunt the immediacy of our enjoyment), then submerge ourselves completely and gauge the aesthetic potency of the work by the intensity and duration of the resulting tingle."
- 17 See, for instance, Monroe Beardsley, *Aesthetics* (New York, 1958).
- 18 In writing and revising this essay, I have tried to do justice to comments from Malcolm Budd, David Hills, Kendall Walton, and David Wiggins.

The language of art criticism

MICHAEL BAXANDALL

It is very difficult to say a great deal about a painting, except by talking about its relationship to something else, whether to other paintings, other arts, contemporary social movements, contemporary beliefs, or contemporary ideas.¹

LIMITATIONS OF THE LEXICON

The specific interest of the visual arts is visual, and one of the art historian's specific faculties is to find words to indicate the character of shapes, colors, and organizations of them. But these words are not so much descriptive as demonstrative: I am not sure how firmly we have grasped the implications of this. Unlike a travel writer or the man who writes about exhibitions in a newspaper, we are not primarily concerned to evoke the visual character of something never seen by our audience. The work of art we discourse on is to some extent present or available, if only in reproduction or in the memory or even more marginally as a visualization derived from knowledge of other objects of the same class, and though the form of our language may be informative – "there is a flow of movement from the left towards the center" – its action is likely to be a sort of verbal pointing. What distinguishes it from manual pointing is mainly that along with direction ("left to center") goes a category of visual interest ("flow of movement"). We are proposing that our audience compare the one with the other.

It is this that goes some way towards extenuating the crudeness of our language. If I apply half-a-dozen simple terms of visual interest (a phrase I am not going to define) to the pencil I am writing with – "long," "thin," "shiny," "green," "of hexagonal section," "with one conical end" – that is a quite inadequate description: to someone who did not have experience of pencils it would not carry an accurate